Introduction
The standard approach to cross-world predication goes back to Russell"s "On Denoting" [Russell 1905 ]. Dealing with the joke about yachts Russell makes use of the notion of quantifier scope and employs quantification over certain abstract objects (degrees) associated with the predicates attributed across worlds. Let us recall the famous story of the irritable yachtsman:
When we say … "So-and-so is surprising" or "So-and-so is true," etc., the "so-and-so" must be a proposition. Suppose now that "so-and-so" contains a denoting phrase. We may either eliminate this denoting phrase from the subordinate proposition "so-and-so," or from the whole proposition in which "so-and-so" is a mere constituent. Different propositions result according to which we do. I have heard of a touchy owner of yacht to whom a guest, on first seeing it, remarked, "I thought your yacht was larger than it is"; and the owner replied, "No, my yacht is not larger than it is". [Russell, 1905, p. 52 ].
Let us denote the original sentence as (1) and its possible interpretation as (2) and (3): (1) I thought your yacht was larger than it is.
(2) The size that I thought your yacht was is greater than the size of your yacht is.
(3) I thought that the size of your yacht was greater than the size of your yacht. Now the misunderstanding can be explained in terms of quantifier scope. Sentences (1) and (2) turns into the following formulas (where s(y) stands for "the size of y", and B is the doxastic operator "the guest believes that"):
According to Russell, (2" ) is what the guest actually meant, whereas (3') is the meaning attributed to him by the yachtsman. Kripke notes that Russell is right in general: "scope does 3 matter in intensional contexts" [Kripke, 2005 [Kripke, , p.1005 . At the same time he alleges that (2') fails adequately to formalize (2), because it attributes an overly specific view to the guest, namely the view of the form B(x = s(y)), which implies existence of a unique size the guest thought the yacht was [Kripke, 2005, p .1021].
The Russellian "degree approach" faces at least three conceptual problems 3 :
1. Apriority. Russell supposes that the guest previously had some idea of the size of the yacht, but that need not be true. He doesn"t have to have such a priori knowledge and he still can be surprised and say "I thought your yacht was larger than it is" [Kripke, 2005, 3. Platonism about degrees and numbers. Perhaps the main philosophical problem with this approach is its "ontological commitment" to certain abstract objects [Kocurek, 2016, p. 17] . In his analysis Russell apparently makes use of reference to degrees and cardinal numbers, whereas the existence of these abstract entities is the question logic should remain neutral on.
The issues listed above indicate that the "degree approach" to analysis of sentences like (1) is rather questionable. At the same time, the very idea of disambiguating such sentences in terms of scope seems to be efficient.
Cross-world predication
Kripke's possible worlds semantics (PWS) for standard quantified modal logic (QML)
implements the idea of scope very carefully. The quantifier scope (wide in (2") and narrow in 3 More detailed consideration of these and other problems can be found in [Kocurek, 2016] .
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(3")) determines the domain of quantification, which changes from world to world, and contains only the objects that actually exist in a given world. However, QML fails to capture some patterns of expression typical in many natural languages. Consider the following example:
(4) Some people could have been richer than they really are Let R stand for "richer than". How would one formalize (4)? On the one hand, a moment"s reflection shows that
doesn"t work. This says that for someone there is a possible world where she is richer than herself (in that world). On the other hand, it doesn"t take much to see that
is also incorrect, because this says that in some possible world, someone (in that world) is richer than herself (in that world).
The most important feature of (4) is that it makes cross-world comparisons. This sentence relates objects in one world to the same objects in another world. To emphasize the difference, compare this with (5) Everyone can be richer than their grandfather, which says about an intra-world relation (relation between objects in the same world). It can be easily formalized as
Thus, QML fails to formalize some simple examples of cross-world predication. This is not just a syntax problem, because the core idea of PWS is largely the idea that all cross-world relations between individuals must be logically reducible to intra-world properties and relations Gary Kemp puts the worry about this idea as follows: "if, for each world, we are given all the non-modal facts which hold at that world, then we have given all the modal facts without residue; for modal facts are nothing but generalisations about facts-at-worlds, non-modal facts at possible worlds. But then each possible fact must be a particular way things could have been -a possible world, specified either fully or only partly (in which case we can speak of what a certain class of fully specified possible worlds have in common). If that were not so, then the possible worlds apparatus could not be claimed as an adequate explication of necessity and possibility.
Yet facts which reach between worlds clearly violate the idea that all possible facts are facts at worlds -that each possible world is a total way that things could be" [Kemp 2000 , p. 309].
There have been many attempts to accommodate cross-world comparatives in QML. Kemp Unfortunately, that approach cannot deal with the sentence (7) John might have been richer than he is, 6 because it is not clear which occurrences of j should bound by the operator A j .
Melia [Melia, 2003 ] exploits the intuitive idea of actuality operators A 1 , ,,, A n , each bounding the fixed argument place of a given n-ary predicate symbol, like in (6"") A 2 R(j,m).
Although this idea seems to be syntactically suitable, its semantics is overly artificial and unclear 4
Cross-world subjunctive modal logic (CSML)
Wehmeier [Wehmeier, 2012] proposes a deliberated approach, based on subjunctive modal logic (SML). Instead of inventing new operators, Wehmeier starts with distinguishing grammatical moods in the syntax (i for "indicative", s for "subjunctive"). The mood markers applied to predicates indicate the worlds relative to which we calculate their extensions. For instance, R i,s should be interpreted as a relation between an object in the actual world and (perhaps the same) object in counterfactual world. Thereby the formula
is to be a correct interpretation of (6 
Two-dimensional (2D) interpretation of cross-world predication
The approaches discussed in the preceding paragraphs focus on one type of intensional The epistemic version of two-dimensionalism, developed by David Chalmers [Chalmers, 2004] , provides a broadly rationalist account of meaning that aims to restore the so-called approach is "a generalization of Wehmeier"s framework that lifts various restrictions he placed on the models and the syntax"
[Kocurek, 2016, Appendix B]. 6 A centered possible world is a metaphysically possible world with a designated agent and time (given 2D assumptions about the plenitude of such worlds).
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"golden triangle" of necessary constitutive relations between meaning, apriority, and necessity.
As Chalmers puts it, "While acknowledging the aspects of meaning and modality that derive from Kripke, it promises to explicate further aspects of meaning and modality that are more closely tied to the rational domain" [Chalmers, 2006] . He argues that the 2D framework can be used to isolate an aspect of meaning that meets our philosophical intuitions about the epistemic necessity and to show its priority to the metaphysical one.
In Given this assumption, two-dimensionalism becomes a fruitful approach to the analysis of Russell's joke. Taking primary intension as epistemic intension one could explain the ambiguity of (1) in terms of centered worlds. What is required for a term to have an epistemic intension for a speaker is for that speaker to have the ability to identify extensions for a term given various hypotheses about the actual world. Therefore, the yachtsman"s mistake is not an evaluation of his guest"s sentence in a wrong world, but setting a wrong center in the right world. It is rather the primary intension of "the yacht" that creates a problem, not the secondary one. Let us consider
as a formalization of (2). This says that there is an object x in the domain of a possible world w accessible to the actual world @,such that in w it is true that x (in w) equals to y (in @), whereas in @ it is true that x (in @) is larger than y (in @).
I argue that (2"") formalizes (2) more accurately than (2") does, because (2"") takes into account the cross-world nature of "=" within the clause expressing belief of the guest. Besides, it
is not committed to degrees.
At the same time, it is worth noting that the difference between identity (=) and counteridentity ( 
Conclusion
To sum up, CSML is a better analytical tool than QML, especially for the cases like a famous joke about yachts. However, the extended Kripke-style possible world semantics for CSML that has been developed by Wehmeier leaves some key epistemic features of Russell"s joke unattended. I argue that epistemic two-dimensionalism is philosophically more relevant here than subjunctive markers approach, because the centered worlds framework can be applied both to linguistic expressions and to thought contents. That is why I hope that the 2D-ineterpretation of jokes about belief attributions doesn"t let them fall flat.
